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Abstract 
This article reviews several approaches to the study of anger in the 
Old Testament. It focuses on the use of methodology in these trends 
with specific reference to the common neglect of Classical Hebrew 
terminology and expressions relating to the emotion of anger. Such 
styles lead to an impoverished understanding of the ideal cognitive 
model of anger as reflected in Classical Hebrew. By contrast, the 
few recent cognitive linguistic studies on the same subject prove to 
be far more successful in giving a detailed account of the ancient 
Israelite conceptualisation of this emotion. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The study of anger and aggression is of chief importance to modern research. 
Its understanding and control is paramount to stability and our survival on 
earth. Despite the numerous works available on the theme of anger in the Old 
Testament deep insight into its nature as conceptualised by the ancient 
Israelites is incomplete. This lack of detailed information is primarily due to the 
fact that most scholars have approached the topic from a restricted theological 
perspective. As a rule, Classical Hebrew has been rejected as a suitable tool 
for the study of such an important subject. Anger is generally viewed as an 
abstract concept that can be separated from the terms and linguistic 
expressions describing this emotion in the Hebrew Bible. Predictably, the 
majority of researchers have adopted study procedures that allow them to 
give little thought to the Hebrew language of anger. 
 Most studies on anger in the Old Testament restrict their attention to 
the function of divine anger as illustrated in the history of ancient Israel 
(Boegner 1878; Kilpatrick 1908; Köhler 1966; Aloysia 1946; Hanson 1946; 
Morris 1952; Simpson 1952; Haney 1960; Eichrodt 1961; Heschel 1962; 
Vögtle 1965; Stöger 1970; Tasker 1980; Westermann 1981; Herion 1992; 
Faessler 1997; Baloian 1997). Others have tried to define this emotion in the 
context of the anthropology of the Old Testament, which they have derived 
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from a limited list of certain key “concepts,” notably vpn, jwr, bl and rcb 
(Robinson 1925; Weill 1926; Pedersen 1959; Johnson 1964; Von Meyenfeldt 
1950; Köhler 1953; Schmidt 1964; Wolff 1973; Lauha 1983; Ben-Chorin 1986; 
Brotzman 1988; North 1995; Schroer & Staubli 1998). This disregard for the 
Classical Hebrew expressions relating to the emotion of anger is unfortunate 
in view of their value as a source for the study of cultural concepts.  
 In recent years it has been found that everyday language reveals much 
about a culture’s cognition (see, e g, Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Dirvin 1995). 
Experiential factors, especially with regard to the body, give rise to the 
formation of linguistic expressions that can be studied successfully to lay bare 
the cultural understanding of abstract concepts, such as the emotions 
(Kövecses 1990, 1995a, 2002). Further, in view of the fact that the physiology 
of emotional experience is largely universal (see, e g, Ekman, Levenson & 
Friesen 1983; Levenson et al 1991; Levenson et al 1992), one can expect to 
find similar concepts of the same emotion in divergent cultures spanning the 
boundaries of time and nationality (see, e g, Kövecses 1995b; Matsuki 1995; 
Yu 1995; Mikolajczuk 1998; Taylor & Mbense 1998). Therefore, although at 
first it might seem questionable to claim that the ancient Israelites 
conceptualised anger in a similar way to contemporary English-speaking 
people, this theory indeed seems plausible in view of present evidence (see, e 
g, Dhorme 1963; Gruber 1980; Smith 1998; Kruger 2000a, 2001; Kotzé 2004). 
This, of course, does not imply that the ancient Israelites did not have very 
distinct concepts of the emotion as well (see, e g, Kotzé 2004).  
 Before examining the cognitive linguistic theory of emotion 
conceptualisation in more detail, the limitations of current theological and 
anthropological trends of research will first be outlined. 
 
2. THE THEOLOGY OF ANGER IN THE OLD TESTAMENT 
For the most part, theologians have been extremely embarrassed by the 
explicit way in which divine anger is described in the Old Testament. Marcion, 
for example, went so far as to totally reject the God of the Hebrew Bible on the 
grounds that he was driven by anger and passion, merciless in his judgement 
and the precipitator of wars (Von Harnack 1985:85). All through the history of 
Christianity, theologians have preferred a God who demonstrates the 
essential quality of impassibility, in accordance with the Stoic ideal of apathy 
(ajpavqeia) (cf Hallie 1967). As a consequence, most works on the topic of 
anger in the Old Testament have endeavoured to define anger as a principle 
of just and controlled retribution. The first and most difficult task of such an 
enterprise would be to dismiss the explicit Classical Hebrew terminology of 
anger as insignificant. 
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Boegner (1878:248-249) holds that anger terms merely describe the 
perverted, transitory “form”, or expression, of anger. Words such as hrj 
“burn,” #xq “foam” and hrb[ “boil over” are inappropriate to express the 
eternal and natural “essence” of anger. Perfect anger, as exemplified by a just 
and holy God, is passive and devoid of any ‘form’ that may be implied by 
language. 
 Although most studies on the topic of anger in the Old Testament 
briefly consider the meaning of relevant Classical Hebrew terms, many 
theologians have thought an investigation of terminology superfluous. For 
example, Kilpatrick (1908:477) merely concerns himself with contrasting the 
“finitude and imperfection” of human anger with the “absolute perfection” of 
divine anger, which is justified in view of the sin and hostility of man (Kilpatrick 
1908:477). 
 Köhler (1966:34-6) regards divine anger to be coupled with the concept 
of holiness. God’s holiness implies that he is totally free from the interference 
of sensations, including anger, which puts him in total control of his own 
actions (Köhler 1966:34). Descriptions of divine anger in the Old Testament 
are therefore no more than accounts of justifiable retribution. 
 Aloysia (1946:407) warns against seeing the Old Testament as “a 
source from which may be drawn instances of swift and dire punishment.” 
Rather, divine anger is always a result of human sin and there was always the 
promise of his anger calming down in the event of repentance (Aloysia 
1946:411). God’s anger is therefore controlled and rational. 
 Hanson (1946-7) identifies divine anger with jealous love. This divine 
love and jealousy is of a different quality than any other, since it claims the 
right to our allegiance: “Man must encounter that love; if he accepts it, in the 
form of love; if he rejects it, in the form of wrath” (Hanson 1946-7:217). In this 
innovative way, Hanson succeeds in justifying divine wrath without detailing its 
nature as a unique emotion. 
 Morris (1952:142) finds it unfortunate that most theologians define 
anger in the Old Testament as an attribute rather than an emotion. However, 
he too merely describes it as divine reaction to human sin (Morris 1952:143). 
In its true essence, divine anger is “a fiery zeal for the right in the service of 
the highest moral ends” (Morris 1952:144). It is subjugated to divine love and 
free of “passion” and the loss of self-control. 
 Simpson (1952) also regards divine anger to be outweighed by his love 
and mercy. Rather than being an arbitrary and malicious emotion, it is a 
permanent state of retributive justice based on the covenant, which, on its 
turn, is based on God’s desire to love a particular people (Simpson 
1952:1135). 
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Haney (1960:15) dismisses the etymology of Classical Hebrew words for 
anger on the grounds that it is inconsequential and non-distinctive. This allows 
him to view anger in the Old Testament as dispossessed of emotional 
components of feeling. Further, it is in total harmony with the ethical principles 
of justice, love and faithfulness (Haney 1960:74-75). 
 Eichrodt (1961:258-269), too, regards the Hebrew language to be of no 
consequence with regard to the true nature of anger. Terms that refer to 
experiential aspects of the emotion, such as burning (@wrj; hmj), snorting (jwr; 
#a), foaming (#[z; ![z), boiling over (hrb[) and the breaking forth of something 
under pressure (#xq), are distinct from the real sense of anger, which was 
changed by the Sinai covenant. Anger, as described in the Old Testament, is 
“reaction against offence against the covenant or its Creator” (Eichrodt 
1961:259). Evidently, anger words and expressions have played no role in 
Eichrodt’s final definition of anger in the Old Testament. 
 In the same way, Heschel (1962:61) holds that Hebrew terminology is 
unsuitable for a description of the true nature of anger since it suggests a 
“loss of self-control, compulsiveness, temporary derangement of the mind and 
the desire or intent to avenge or punish.” Anger in the Old Testament is not an 
incontrollable “passion,” but “pathos.” As established by a sovereign, 
righteous and free God, it is not an emotion, but a permanent disposition 
governed by love and mercy (Heschel 1962:62). 
 Vögtle (1965:1403-1405) focuses on figurative expressions in his 
criticism of the Hebrew language of anger. Vögtle (1965:1404) finds it 
regrettable that symbols, such as fire, wine-cup and breath were used to 
describe anger in earlier writings, since they imply something irrational. Their 
incongruity with the concept of anger as deserved castigation for sin was 
evidenced by the fact that they were almost entirely discontinued in the New 
Testament, which speaks of divine wrath as superseded by divine love. 
 Similarly, Stöger (1970:1006-7) rejects anger terminology as a suitable 
vehicle for the Old Testament concept as anger as the reaction of a loving 
God to the violation of the covenant. For him, linguistic expressions of anger 
are anthropomorphisms that were discontinued in later writings due to their 
incompatibility with the real nature of anger, which, in later writings, ceased to 
be an emotion. The description of anger “as an inner fire, and its effect as the 
snorting, foaming, boiling, and bursting of pent-up energy” (Stöger:1007) was 
therefore withdrawn. 
 According to Tasker (1980:1657), Hebrew terminology for anger 
suggests “something wayward, fitful and spasmodic.” For this reason it is 
unsuitable to describe divine anger, which is “the permanent attitude of the 
holy and just God when confronted by sin and evil” (Tasker 1980:1657). 
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Although Westermann (1981:147-156) considers the concepts that may be 
implied by the Classical Hebrew terminology of anger in a few words, he also 
regards these to be unconnected to the real nature of anger as demonstrated 
in the history of ancient Israel. His cut down definition of divine anger as divine 
judgement (Westermann 1981:153) is unrelated to any study of Classical 
Hebrew terms and expressions for anger. 
 Herion (1992:989-996) follows Heschel (1962) in differentiating 
between the “passion” and the “pathos” of anger. The meanings of the 
Classical Hebrew terms for anger describe the “passion” of anger as the 
human loss of self-control. This “passion” as expressed in language is in 
conflict with the dominant concept of anger in the Old Testament as a 
controlled, ethical principle of just punishment for sin. 
 Baloian (1992:5-7) briefly considers words for anger in the Old 
Testament in view of their meanings. For real conceptual content, however, 
he turns to the theology of the Old Testament. Both his monograph (Baloian 
1992:20-28) and his article (Baloian 1997:377-378) emphasise Biblical 
admonitions to control anger. Baloian (1997:380-381) further regards the Old 
Testament concept of anger to imply judgement proceeding from a just and 
legal context rather than emotional passion. 
 Faessler (1997:91-108) regards Hebrew words and expressions for 
anger to be applicable only to human anger, which is characterised by 
impatience, blindness, uncontrollability and loss of speech (Faessler 1997:93-
96). His target, by contrast, is to point up “la ‘sainte colère’ de Dieu biblique.” 
He tactically chooses to analyse the story of the Golden Calf in Exodus 32, 
which illustrates that God is in total control of his anger. 
 All the studies listed above have tried to describe anger as a 
theological concept devoid of emotional content. Most of the theologians have 
dismissed Hebrew terminology as non-distinctive and immaterial for the study 
of the ancient Israelite conceptualisation of anger. Classical Hebrew data, 
however, points to an ideal cognitive model of anger that can by no means be 
reduced to a concept of just retribution for wrongdoing. The ancient Israelites 
drew from the totality of their human experience to characterise both human 
and divine anger by means of language. 
 Although sociological and anthropological studies of the ancient 
Israelite culture have contributed more to a better understanding of the 
conceptualisation of emotions in the Old Testament, the insight gained from 
these is restricted due to a limited focus on a few selected key concepts.  
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3. ANGER IN SOCIOLOGICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
STUDIES OF THE ANCIENT ISRAELITE CULTURE 
The value of sociology and anthropology for a better understanding of the Old 
Testament cannot be denied (cf Kruger 2000b:137-173). For example, with 
regard to the emotions, scholars have shown how the fear of supernatural 
dangers gave rise to purity laws and ritual (cf Smith 1923:152-154; Frazer 
1934; Douglas 1975; Caplice 1974). These findings have been applied 
successfully by theologians to make sense of the, often ambiguous, purity 
regulations (cf Kutsch 1965:28; Wenham 1981, 1983; Wright 1987; Podella 
1997).  
 However, these studies are of limited value to an understanding of 
ancient Israelite conceptions of the emotions since they only identify 
conscious and subconscious causes of fear and its expression in ritual. 
Therefore, we will restrict our survey of anthropological approaches to those 
that are expected to have implications for an appreciation of the concepts of 
anger as they relate to physical experience and expression. 
 The discovery of the central nervous system and its implications for 
cognition and emotion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to a slow 
abandonment of the Greek notion of an incarnated soul. Old Testament 
scholars then tried to contrast Israelite thinking with that of Greek, claiming 
that the unity of soul and body was always implied by the ancient Israelites. 
Therefore, the Greek dualism of soul (pneu'ma) and body (savrx), especially in 
the Pauline epistles, was foreign to Israelite thinking.  
 Part of the quest to describe the Hebrew thinking as devoid of dualism, 
was to show that the words that were usually translated as soul (vpn) and 
spirit (jwr) in fact often refer to material things. Weill (1926:62-63), for 
example, shows that vpn could be used to speak of the throat. Others tried to 
uncover some holistic Hebrew thinking in the use of such terms. 
 Robinson (1925) holds that the failure to distinguish between the 
material and spiritual is a common trait of “primitive peoples”: 
 
The primitive Semitic idea of man seems to have been very much 
like that which we find amongst other primitive peoples, of the 
ancient or of the modern world. There is no distinction of the 
psychical and ethical from the physical, so that the actual breath of 
man can be thought of as his “soul”, and the reek of hot blood 
identified with this breath-soul. Psychical and ethical functions are 
considered to be just as appropriate to the bodily organs as the 
physiological. 
 
(Robinson 1925:353) 
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Further, Robinson is of the opinion that the ancient Israelites assigned to 
bodily organs psychical functions due to their ignorance of the brain and 
central nervous system. He develops the notion of a diffusion of 
consciousness: 
 
Though there was entire ignorance of the nervous system, man’s 
consciousness, with its ethical qualities, was thought to be so 
diffused through the whole body that the flesh and bones, as well 
as the mouth, eye, ear, hand, had a quasi-consciousness of their 
own. Man’s organism is in fact a “United States,” rather than a 
monarchic or imperialistic realm. 
 
(Robinson 1925:354) 
 
Robinson limits his investigation to the Hebrew terms vpn, jwr and bl to show 
how Hebrew psychology was tied up with their conception of the body. He 
(Robinson 1925:355) argues that vpn later was used to speak of the body, 
which suggests that, “the body is the predominant partner in the Hebrew idea 
of personality.” Robinson (1925:361) concludes that vpn and jwr designates 
the same thing, namely the conscious life of man, associated with the breath 
as the vital principle. They were used to talk about the “breath-soul” which 
primarily represented emotional phenomena. In fact, for Robinson (1925:361) 
it symbolises much more, “… because ‘spirit’ originally denoted an energy 
acting on man from without, a divine energy, it naturally suggests a higher 
conception of the life of man, as drawn from God.” This spiritualisation of the 
emotional life of the Hebrew man leads him to, for example, declare Saul’s 
anger and madness as “inspired” by the “energy (hwr) of YHWH” (Robinson 
1925:358-359). 
 The rest of the organs denote the “heart-soul,” due to its chief 
importance (Robinson 1925:362-364). bl is used to suggest the mental rather 
than emotional activities of consciousness. According to Robinson (1925:363-
364) its most important and characteristic use is for volition, which is primary 
in Israelite ethics. 
 Robinson’s unwillingness to accept that body parts could have been 
used metaphorically to refer to perceived bodily changes accompanying 
specific emotions is a major drawback in his work. This prevents him from 
recognising a clearer structure in the emotional conceptualisation of the 
ancient Israelites, and he concludes: “The usage of psychological terms in the 
Old Testament is not systematic, but syncretistic; a number of originally 
independent explanations, such as blood-soul, breath/soul, heart, et cetera 
have been brought together by popular use, and have settled down into a sort 
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of working agreement and division of labour, though with much overlapping” 
(Robinson 1925:354). 
 More recently it has been realised that the psychological use of body 
parts in the Hebrew Bible are due to the actual physical sensations felt during 
specific emotional episodes (Smith 1998) and that they can refer to specific 
conceptualisations of such distinct emotions (Kruger 2000a, 2001).  
 Pedersen (1959:99-262) also thought of the Hebrew soul not as part of 
the body, but rather as denoting man in its totality. Pedersen (1959:171) refers 
to the creation story to illustrate this inseparability of body and soul: “The man 
of clay was a dead thing, but by the breath of God he was entirely changed 
and became a living soul. Soul and body are so intimately united that a 
distinction cannot be made between them. They are more than “united”: the 
body is the soul in its outward form.” 
 Like Robinson, he argues that this idea of unity was essentially 
expressed by the Hebrew words vpn, jwr and bl (1959:102-106), but also 
includes other organs in his review (Pedersen 1959:171-175). These organs 
are so filled with soul that their movement should not be seen as the 
expression of inner states. More precisely, these are the activities of the soul 
itself: 
 
All of these examples show how the Israelite sees the soul 
manifesting itself in the body. It bears witness to his psychological 
observation and his sense of reality. He concludes not from the 
movements of the body to an underlying soul, which uses and 
moves the body, but in the activity of the soul he sees the soul 
itself. 
 
(Pedersen 1959:176) 
 
Pedersen’s descriptions of the ancient Israelite “soul” include a lot of indirect 
descriptions of several emotions, but unfortunately they lack completeness 
and cohesion due to his determination to denote the Hebrew man as a soul. 
His results are further impaired by his focal interest in the terms vpn, jwr and 
bl. Yet another important drawback is his simplistic translation of these terms 
as “soul”. Their metaphoric use with reference to the physiology of the 
emotions seems to go completely unnoticed. For example, there are instances 
where jwr clearly refers to the blowing through the nostrils when experiencing 
an intense form of anger (cf Job 4:9; Ps 18:15[16]). 
 Johnson (1964) adopts the same approach to the study of Hebrew 
psychology as Robinson and Pedersen. References to parts of the body 
indicate psychic activities, and therefore prove that the ancient Israelites 
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thought of man to be a psychophysical whole: “The conception of man as a 
psycho-physical organism may be seen equally clearly when one examines 
the use of the terminology for the various parts of the body; … they are 
sometimes spoken of as themselves actively engaged in some form of 
personal behaviour or as characterised by some personal quality” (Johnson 
1964:37). 
 Johnson (1964:2-3) makes vpn the main focus of his study, but 
maintains that “the soul-stuff or soul-substance is perceived, not only in the 
various members and secretions of the body, but also in a more extended 
form in whatever bears traces of contact with him.” For example, he illustrates 
how the face could reveal various emotions, moods, and dispositions 
(Johnson 1949:40-1). It is described as expressing anger (Gn 31:2, cf v 5), joy 
(Job 29:24), fear (Is 13:8; Ezk 27:35; Jl 2:6; Nah 2:11), anguish (Jr 30:6), or 
some corresponding form of distress (Gn 40:7; Job 16:16; Ec 7:3; Neh 2:2, 3).  
 Johnson is one of the first to admit the metaphoric use of body parts to 
speak of physiological changes accompanying certain emotions. About vpn he 
writes that it was used to denote breathing as a metonymy of anger: “Indeed 
there is something of a parallel in the case of the term #a, which could be 
used equally well of the ‘nostril’ and of that quick nasal breathing which is 
indicative of anger” (Johnson 1964:6-7). 
 Johnson’s work added valuable insight in the ancient Israelite 
conception of a wide range of emotions. Unfortunately, he often glosses over 
the use of emotion terminology and presents no integrated conceptual model 
for distinct emotions.  
 Johnson (1964:39) also criticises Robinson’s theory of the “diffusion of 
consciousness” on the basis that the different parts of the body are often used 
as synecdoches for a man’s person or self as a whole. For example, the 
bones (!x[) are said to decay or become soft with fear or distress (Hab 3:16; 
Jr 23:9) and so “provide an obvious parallel to the term vpn” (Johnson 
1964:67-68). Unfortunately, in seeing !x[ as a synecdoche for vpn, its obvious 
metaphoric use referring to bodily sensations as felt in the event of fear is 
ignored. 
 Von Meyenfeldt (1950:137-142) gave only passing attention to the 
heart being used in the context of emotion. He saw its primary function as 
reinforcing emotions such as distress and joy. This is especially true when 
used with the prepositions d[ and la: “Beide voorzetsels zijn 
richtingaangevend, in dit geval de richting van de oppervlakte naar de diepte. 
Het is geen overdreven, maar echte smart” (Von Meyenfeldt 1950:137). 
The incomprehension of subjective feeling as source of these expressions is 
once again striking. This is also true of his review of bl’s use to speak of other 
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emotions. With regard to fear, for example, he lists the passages where it 
occurred, noted that the heart is said to become weak, melt away, and shiver 
(Von Meyenfeldt 1950:139-140). From this he concluded that the heart was 
conceptualised as a mouldable or fusible substance (Dutch: kneedbare of 
smeltbare massa), and a suitable breeding place for anxiety (Von Meyenfeldt 
1950:140). No further attempt is made, however, to give an account of the 
cultural conceptualisation of these emotions as they relate to subjective 
experience. Hence, the insights gained remain superficial and incomplete. 
 Köhler (1953:101) is very reluctant to attempt a coherent and 
understandable description of the psychological world of the ancient Israelites, 
since he feels that such an exercise would be futile. Köhler is of the opinion 
that the emotional life of an ancient culture is relatively “dry” compared to that 
of a contemporary culture. By “dry” he does not mean cold-blooded. About the 
“Hebrew Soul” he claims that, “Sie ist rascher, aber nicht bloß rascher, 
sondern auch stärker, leidenschaftlicher, bis ins äußerste hinein bewegbar 
und erregbar” (Köhler 1953:109). 
 Unfortunately Köhler (1953) does not believe that a description of the 
ancient Israelite conception of emotion would be possible, since, according to 
him, modern cultures had complex systems of emotional meaning, and it 
would be too difficult to describe psychological phenomena of an ancient 
culture in modern words and concepts: “Darum wäre es untunlich, in einem 
geschlossenen Gefüge die Einzelseiten des geistigen Bildes des hebräischen 
Menschen abhandeln zu wollen. Viele Seiten blieben inhaltslos, und das 
Ganze der Darstellung böte sich als ein trockenes und wenig, wenn nicht 
nichts sagendes Nacheinander von Angaben dar“ (Köhler 1953:101). 
 Schmidt (1964:374-90) is concerned about the way in which the 
“concepts” vpn, jwr, bl and rcb are usually translated. Just like his 
predecessors (cf Robinson 1925; Pedersen 1959; Johnson 1964) Schmidt is 
worried that a translation of these terms might wrongly convey some implied 
dualisms: 
 
Zwischen der eigenen Wiedergabe und den Texten selbst besteht 
ein charakteristischer Unterschied in den Begriffen. Die Wahl 
anderer Begriffe zieht jedoch einen Unterschied in der Sache nach 
sich. So gewichtige, bei der Exegese oft vorausgesetzte 
Gegensätze, wie Form und Inhalt, Körper und Seele oder Geist, 
Physisches und Psychisches oder Geschichte und Natur, sind dem 
Alten Testament fremd.  
 
(Schmidt 1964:375) 
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As a student of Wolff (cf Anthropologie des Alten Testaments, 1973), Schmidt 
(1964:375) wanted to answer the question: “Wie denkt das Alte Testament 
selbst.” He is of the opinion that the answer lies in the Hauptbegriffen vom 
Menschen, namely vpn, jwr and rcb: “… der Sache nach [ist] in allen drei 
Begriffen nicht jeweils ein Teil des Menschen neben anderen, sondern der 
Mensch als ganzer und als Einheit gemeint“ (Schmidt 1964:376). 
 Schmidt goes on to list all the different possible meanings of these 
terms. Unfortunately, his analysis of their use with relation to emotion is very 
brief. He points out that to be “short of vpn” meant to be impatient (Nm 21:4; 
Jdg 10:16, 16:16; Zch 11:8), whereas being “long of vpn” denoted patience 
(Ezk 6:11), “denn bei Ungeduld atmet man schneller, während eine 
‘langatmige’ Rede die Geduld des Hörers beansprucht” (Schmidt 1964:380). 
Schmidt (1964:382) argues that jwr is often used to designate the seat of 
feelings, and can become bitter, or anguished (Gn 26:35). Similarly, bl could 
shiver when afraid (Is 7:5; cf. Ps 27:3) (Schmidt 1964:383-6). 
 Schmidt’s focus on the terms vpn, jwr, bl and rcb is a major flaw, but 
at least he is aware of the fact that some expressions on the subject of 
emotions had their origin in subjective experience. 
 Wolff’s (1973) approach to ancient Israelite psychology does not differ 
much from that of Robinson (1925), Pedersen (1959), Johnson (1964) and 
Schmidt (1964) in that he makes specific terms (G. Begriffe) his point of 
departure in his attempt to describe ancient Israelite anthropology. His list of 
principal terms includes the usual vpn, jwr, rcb and bl (Wolff 1973:21). 
Again, the main concern is to prove that these terms did not reflect any 
dualism in thinking: 
 
Wenn die häufigsten Hauptwörter in der Regel mit “Herz”, “Seele”, 
“Fleisch” und “Geist” übersetzt werden, so sind damit 
folgenschwere Missverständnisse erzeugt worden. Sie gehen 
schon auf die altgriechische Übersetzung der Septuaginta zurück 
und verführten zu einer dichotomischen oder trichotomischen 
Anthropologie, in der der Körper und die Seele und der Geist in 
Gegensatz zueinander geraten. 
 
(Wolff 1973:21) 
 
Consequently, as with the other anthropologists, these terms’ use in emotional 
contexts received only secondary attention. For example, Wolff (1973:35-37) 
thinks that vpn, although often used in relation to several different emotions, 
primarily denoted man in need. When meaning “throat” it can also mean 
“breathing,” just as “nose” can be used metaphorically to denote “breath”, so 
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that “das Organ der Atmung und der Atem selbst zusammengesehen werden” 
(Wolff 1973:29). Again no structured conceptual model for any emotion is 
attempted. 
 Lauha (1983:22) is aware of the limitations of an attempt to find 
emotional meaning through an exclusive focus on the terms vpn, jwr and bl. 
Lauha (1983:10-24) criticises the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, as expressed by 
Wolff (1973), Pedersen (1959) and Johnson’s (1964) theory that ancient 
Israelite language determined Hebrew thinking. Rather, everyone is born with 
a pre-programmed universal grammar, which means that there is no word or 
concept in one language that cannot be adequately translated into another 
(Lauha 1983:15). Further, Lauha (1983:24-30) sees a distinct danger in any 
approach that limits its investigation to isolated terms. This, he claims (Lauha 
1983:26-27), could lead to illegitimate meanings being ascribed to such 
words. One should rather identify a semantic field and consider all the 
different words that add to the meaning of this concept (Lauha 1983:24-28). 
 Lauha applies this theory to the concepts vpn, jwr and bl to indicate 
how they are used with other roots to typify joy, mourning and pain, courage, 
fear, pride, humility, love, hate and anger. Let’s consider his results with 
regard to the emotion of anger. 
 bl is sometimes used with expressions of heat to speak of anger 
(Lauha 1983:224). In Deuteronomy 19:6 it is said of a person that takes 
revenge that his heart burns: wbbl !mj yk (see also Ps 39:4). The imagery of 
fire va and smoke (@c[) is also quite common in this context (Lauha 
1983:224). vpn and jwr can also denote anger on their own (Lauha 1983:227). 
In Proverbs 29:11 the expression ayxwy wjwr means giving free vent to one’s 
anger (Lauha 1983:152). 
 Lauha identifies numerous roots and expressions for anger. However, 
since he was primarily interested in the semantics of vpn, jwr and bl he 
showed little interest in the possible conceptual content that these might have 
had. Consequently, for example, he declines any attempt to link anger with 
breath (Lauha 1983:228). Nevertheless, his lists of words relating to the 
semantic field of distinct emotions are comprehensive and estimable. 
 Lauha’s study by no means heralds the cessation of endeavours to see 
in vpn, jwr bl a Hebrew anthropology of unity. Ben-Chorin (1986:55) denied 
the existence of a Pauline dualism between body and spirit in the Hebrew 
Bible. For him, vpn and jwr are encompassed by the body rcb. 
 Brotzman (1988:400-409), too, saw vpn as a key term whose meaning 
pointed to a holistic view of man. He concludes that vpn basically meant 
“being” or “creature” as a unit, and that this “… is decidedly opposed to the 
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common Greek idea of a “soul” imprisoned in a body, and to the idea 
expressed by some branches of Protestant and Roman Catholic thought that 
the pathway to righteousness is found by downplaying the body and 
encouraging ‘the higher part of man’” (Brotzman 1988:407). 
 With regard to the emotions, Brotzman (1988:403-404) simply points 
out that the semantic fields of vpn and jwr could overlap and they were used 
to allude to such emotions as impatience, bitterness and sadness. jwr on its 
own was used to speak of pride, humility, anger and self-control (Brotzman 
1988:404). No consideration is given to its possible use as a tool to express 
conceptual meaning with regard to emotions (cf Can 5:6). 
 Schroer and Staubli (1998:68-73) were also quick to point to the 
inadequacy of yu–chvv to translate vpn: “Denn die Seelenbegriff der griechischen 
Philosophie ist mit der hebräischen Vorstellung von der vpn überhaupt nicht zu 
vergleichen” (Schroer & Staubli 1998:68). Its application to express emotion 
did not come into play in their work. Rather, emotion is localised in the organs 
(Schroer & Staubli 1998:75). For example, the liver dbk was associated with 
grief (Lm 2:11) and happiness (Ps 16:9) (Schroer & Staubli 1998:77). Also the 
heart and kidneys were referred to in the context of grief (Ps 73:21) (Schroer 
& Staubli 1998:77). The loss of heart in the context of fear was also a 
common concept in the ancient Near East (Schroer & Staubli 1998:48). 
Emotions such as sadness, fear, contempt and shame can be expressed in 
the face (Schroer & Staubli 1998:95-97). Heavy breathing was equated with 
anger, which gave rise to the metaphoric use of #a in this context (Schroer & 
Staubli 1998:105-106). 
 Schroer and Staubli devote little attention to emotional expression in 
the body. The traditional contrast between Greek and Hebrew thinking is 
evident, as well as the notion of emotion being located in body parts. 
 North (1995:33) also regards the heart as the seat of emotions. It can 
be gladdened (Pr 27:11), saddened (Neh 2:2), frightened (1 Sm 4:13), 
courageous (2 Sm 17:10) and full of love (Dt 6:5). However, his way of 
proving the holistic ways of Hebrew thinking was to argue that the Israelites 
had an understanding of some central nervous system: “Ancient Israelites had 
no word for brain and did not associate thinking with the head. Instead, 
thought and will were entwined with what we call emotions. The biblical bl 
corresponded largely to the functioning of the nervous system, which the 
ancients identified as the internal organs of the torso” (North 1995:33). 
 We can conclude that the major interest in twentieth century research 
on emotion in the Old Testament concerned itself with proving that the ancient 
Israelites had a holistic view of man. A convenient and successful way to do 
this was to produce evidence that body parts were seen to be the seats of 
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emotions. The recurrent argument is: since emotions are located in, or bound 
to body parts, they cannot exist apart from the body. Ergo, there is no Greek 
dualism in Hebrew thought.  
 Regrettably, this line of thinking obscured the fact that allusions to 
viscera and other parts of the human anatomy can be explained by the fact 
that the emotions in question were actually felt there (Smith 1998:427-436). 
Words such as vpn, jwr, bl and rcb are not mere labels for different 
emotions. They are metaphoric ways of speaking about emotion whereby the 
ways in which the ancient Israelite experienced and understood their emotions 
are revealed (cf Kruger 2000a, 2001). 
 The study of the emotional use of language referring to human 
anatomy unquestionably added to our knowledge of the ancient Israelite 
conception of their emotions. In spite of the fact that the investigations were 
mostly limited to the use of only a few terms, notably vpn, jwr, bl and rcb, 
investigations such as the ones listed above led to a new appreciation of the 
uniqueness of the ancient Israelite way of thinking. From the above survey it is 
clear, however, that a full understanding of the psychology of emotions cannot 
be arrived at when the emotional use of these terms are considered only in a 
secondary sense. As a result no integrative, systematic description of the 
ancient Israelite perception of emotions has yet been achieved by this 
approach. This can partly be by reason of the fact that scholars have always 
been very hesitant to ascribe any structure to the psychological or emotional 
life of the ancient Israelites. Many have noticed the importance of such terms 
as vpn, jwr, bl, and occasionally rcb in their conceptualisation of the 
emotions, but few have attempted a detailed description of distinct emotions. 
 
4. THE COGNITIVE INTERPRETATION OF ANGER 
LANGUAGE IN THE OLD TESTAMENT 
The study of the non-verbal communication of emotion in the Hebrew Bible is 
of special importance to a better understanding of ancient Israelite 
conceptions of anger. Darwin (1904:28) points out that: “Certain complex 
actions are of direct or indirect service under certain states of the mind, in 
order to relieve or gratify certain sensations, desires, etc; and whenever the 
same state of mind is induced, however feebly, there is a tendency through 
the force of habit and association for the same movements to be performed, 
though they may not be of the least use.” It is therefore not surprising that 
somatic expressions of anger should have given rise to linguistic expressions 
denoting anger in Classical Hebrew. 
 Darwin makes use of examples from the Bible to illustrate how bodily 
action can be expressive of emotional states. With regard to fear, he holds: 
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There is a well-known and grand description in Job: “In thoughts 
from the visions of the night, when deep sleep falleth on men, fear 
came upon me, and trembling, which made all my bones to shake. 
Then a spirit passed before my face; the hair of my flesh stood up: 
it stood still, but I could not discern the form thereof: an image was 
before mine eyes, there was silence, and I heard a voice, saying, 
Shall mortal man be more just than God? Shall a man be more pure 
than his Maker? (Job 4:13). 
 
(Darwin 1904:308) 
 
The Hebrew Bible being so rich in examples of the physical expression of 
different emotions, it is surprising that Darwin’s work inspired so few Biblical 
scholars to do an extensive study of the subject (see also Kruger 1998). One 
of the first investigations of the subject in the Old Testament was done by 
Vorwahl (1932) more than half a century after Darwin’s book on the 
expression of emotion was first published. Focussing on non-verbal 
expression in general, Vorwahl’s treatment of specific emotions was 
perfunctory. The emotion of anger received little attention and his discussion 
of this spanned less than two pages (Vorwahl 1932:17-18). 
 On the subject of anger, Vorwahl reckons its manifestations in the 
Hebrew Bible to be associated with self-defence (Job 31:21), petulance in the 
context of fasting (Is 58:4; Job 31:21) and pride (Ex 17:11). The indications of 
anger that he identifies are hitting or waving with a fist (Is 9:10, 10:4, 58:4; Job 
31:21; Ps 106:9), stretching out an arm (Gn 16:12; Ex 14:8, 17:11, 24:11; Is 
5:25; cf. Pr 1:24) and clapping of hands (Nm 24:10; Job 27:23). Vorwahl 
(1932:18) also argues that prints of the hand in Hebrew and Phoenician 
iconography should be interpreted as indicating threatening anger. 
 Vorwahl (1932:18) also identifies several facial indications of anger, 
namely the rolling of the eyes (Job 15:12), a sullen (zmr) or angry face (Dn 
3:19), an evil look (Gn 31:2; Am 9:4), hiding of the face (Is 54:8; 59:2; Ezk 
39:23; cf. Job 13:24) and steam escaping from the nostrils (2 Sm 22:9; Is 
65:5; Ps 18:9, 74:1). 
 Vorwahl’s work is followed by a long period of neglect with regard to 
the study of emotional expression in the Hebrew Bible. Fortunately, the recent 
upsurge in research on emotion coincided with serious attention being given 
to its expression, especially in the face (see, e g, Izard 1977). This renewed 
interest in emotion is also reflected in Biblical scholarship. Gruber’s (1980) 
investigation of non-verbal communication in the ancient Near East included 
accounts of non-verbal indications of sadness, anger and happiness. Let us 
assess his description of anger expressions. 
HTS 60(3) 2004  857 
A cognitive linguistic approach to the emotion of anger 
Gruber (1980:483) made the very important observation that the “somatic 
expressions of anger should have given rise to verbs, nouns, and idioms 
denoting anger.” With regard to the metaphoric use of #a, he points to the 
limitations of approaches that viewed references to the organs as mere idioms 
expressing emotion: “Thus while experimental psychology demonstrates a 
direct connection between anger and specific somatic reactions including the 
face and the nose, standard reference works and specialized studies on 
Biblical Hebrew give the impression that any such connections reflected in 
Biblical Hebrew are to be regarded as at best arbitrary but more likely foolish” 
(Gruber 1980:486). 
 He listed the expression #a hrj as denoting “be angry” saying that it 
derived from the “well-known reddening of the faces of angry persons” 
(Gruber 1980:491). Other expressions derived from the same physiological 
effect, are the synonymous and #a r[b and ypab va hjdq  (Gruber 1980:500-
501). Gruber (1980:502-50) also identifies expressions for anger deriving from 
other physiological concomitants of anger. These include expressions 
stemming from frowning, such as !ypa rxq (lit. “short of face”) and #a qyzjh, 
“to stiffen the face” (Gruber 1980:503). In addition, wpab @c[ hl[ “smoke went 
up from his nose” refers to the same effect as the English “fuming” to denote 
anger. Gruber (1980:510-50) furthermore argues that #a hmj should be 
rendered as “foaming at the mouth” as an expression of anger. He bases this 
argument on the fact that the primary meaning of hmj was “venom, poison” 
whose side effects could create effects similar to epileptic seizures. Anger 
could have been perceived as an extreme form of epilepsy (Gruber 
1980:540). 
 The study of emotional expression made a very important contribution 
to our understanding of the ancient Israelite conception of emotion in that it 
shows that gestures and corporeal language are expressions of inner states, 
and thus have communicative intent. A study of a culture’s perception about 
an emotion should therefore take its bodily expression seriously. However, 
since expression remains only one component of the overall emotional 
process (Scherer 2001), even a very detailed account of the expressive 
features of an emotion will not suffice to describe the cultural understanding of 
an emotion in a comprehensive way. 
 Dhorme (1963) comes close to a systematic description of the 
psychology of ancient Israel by taking a close look at the metaphoric use of 
body parts in Classical Hebrew and Akkadian. He is not interested in proving 
the homogeneity of an Israelite person, which allows him to see the real 
metaphoric value of the countless anatomic references in the Old Testament. 
Dhorme (1963:3) is concerned about the insufficiency of classification in 
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dictionaries and wants to investigate the development of metaphoric meaning 
in Hebrew and Akkadian literature. A comparative study would not only reveal 
how the same images were used in different Semitic cultures, but also throw 
light on the more specific metaphoric use by biblical poets (Dhorme 1963:3). 
One brief example will suffice to illustrate his sensitivity to the origin of 
metaphors in sensation. About the nose, Dhorme (1963:80-1) holds that it was 
above all the organ of breathing, and it was the acceleration of nasal 
respiration that struck the Israelites as a symptom of anger. This symptom can 
be regarded as the source for the metaphor #a jwr, “breath of the nose”, 
which is used to designate anger (Job 4:9). As might be expected, #a and 
!ypa became synonyms for anger (Dhorme 1963:81). Dhorme (1963:81) 
clearly affirms that these expressions are due to the effects of anger on 
breathing: “Ce qui a permis cet usage, c’est l’influence de la colère sur la 
respiration” (Dhorme 1963:81). He goes on to illustrate how this physical 
concomitant of anger gave rise to other related metaphors: “Ainsi, dans Sir 
5:11, nous aurons jwr ^ra ‘longueur de souffle’ pour représenter la patience, 
le retard apporté à la colère. Mais, dans Prov 25:15, ce sera !ypa ^ra 
‘longueur des narines’ avec le même sens” (Dhorme 1963:81). 
 Although Dhorme is aware of anger’s association with the heat 
metaphor (Dhorme 1963:81), he fails to point out that the expression #a hrj 
is probably derived from the perception of redness in the face of angry 
persons. Furthermore, #a’s use with words expressing heat is far more 
recurrent than its use with jwr (cf Kruger 2000a). Thus, it is possible that #a’s 
use referring to anger could be due to its becoming red during anger rather 
than its association with breathing. 
 Dhorme’s cognisance of the organic basis of metaphors is 
commendable. However, since his primary interest was isolated metaphors 
rather than the conceptual models of emotion underlying these, metaphors of 
great import received only passing attention.  
 In his cognitive interpretation of anger language in the Hebrew Bible, 
Kruger (2000a) applies the Lakoff-Kövecses model of anger in American 
English to Hebrew data. The great success of this methodology testifies to the 
fact that emotion terminology has the experience of universal physiological 
changes as their source (Ekman et al 1983; Levenson et al 1991; Levenson et 
al 1992; Kövecses 1995b). Kruger (2000a:187-91) identifies six metaphors, 
namely, anger is the heat of a fluid in a container, anger is fire, anger is an 
opponent, anger is a dangerous animal, anger is presence and anger is 
bounded space. Kruger (2000a:191) also makes out one metonymy, which is 
violent, frustrated behaviour stands for anger. 
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In another publication Kruger (2000c:155-162) further demonstrates the value 
of a cognitive linguistic approach to obscure terminology. He shows how the 
ambiguous hacm dbk in the cultic theophany of Isaiah 30:27 can be regarded 
as a vehicle for the entailment when the intensity of anger rises, the fluid rises 
of the compound metaphor anger is the heat of a fluid in a container. He aptly 
translates this locution with “his anger (lit. “his rising up”) is overwhelming” 
(Kruger 2000c:162). 
 While not wide-ranging, the few cognitive linguistic studies on the topic 
of anger in the Old Testament listed above challenges the restricted 
theological interpretation of anger as a mere principle of justice. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Most of the studies on anger in the Hebrew Bible seem to have been 
dominated by theological intent, aiming only at some theological delineation of 
the wrath of God. This proves to be true even of entries in biblical lexicons 
and encyclopaedias. They all lacked interest in the cognitive interpretation of 
emotions by the ancient Israelites. Further, although biblical anthropologists 
succeed in giving an account of the different meanings of vpn, jwr, bl and 
rcb, a description of the emotion processes comprising different cognitive, 
psychological and physiological components is not arrived at (cf Frijda 1989; 
Kövecses 1995b; Scherer 2001; Ellsworth & Scherer 2002). The listing of 
different expressive components of several emotions by Vorwahl and Gruber 
arguably come closer to an integrated conceptual definition of such emotions, 
but even here a lot of language relating to subjective feeling states seemed to 
have gone unnoticed (cf Smith 1998), thus leaving gaps in the picture.  
 For the most part, the subject of emotions in the Hebrew Bible is a 
derelict topic and deserves extensive treatment (Kruger 2000a:181). A mere 
study of anthropological terms expressing emotional meaning will not suffice. 
Even an intensive study of all the terms for a specific emotion will not serve 
the purpose, since conceptualisations about its physiology and 
phenomenology have to be inferred from metaphoric expressions (cf 
Kövecses 1990:32; Kruger 2000a:187-91, 2001:77-87). The studies listed 
above have shown that, in addition to the descriptive Hebrew terms for anger, 
there are numerous figurative expressions describing anger as an emotion. 
These figurative expressions had as their basis the physical experience of 
anger as well as environmental and cultural elements. A verifiable study of 
anger in the Old Testament needs to account for the concepts that these 
words and expressions stand for. The cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor 
seems to provide the ideal methodology for the scientific study of these 
emotion concepts. 
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